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Abstract
It is significant and complex to solve the problem of 
unequal pay for equal work between the temporary 
workers and the reference employees. The paper believes 
decision of temporary workers’ remuneration involves 
in labor pricing and internal human capital pricing in 
employment service agency. Comparing with the internal 
human capital pricing subordinating to micro human 
resource management, labor pricing is subject to market 
mechanism with bargaining or tendering and bidding as 
main price formation mechanisms. The paper explores 
the feasible approaches to pay temporary workers more 
equally in the case of bargaining or tendering and bidding 
and make suggestions for raising centralization degree and 
specialization degree of employment service agencies and 
giving more preferential policies to temporary workers.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the employment service industry has 
developed rapidly. As a result, about sixty millions of 
labors dispatching workers were working at employing 
units in China in 20111. If considering the labors trusting 
theirs organizational affiliation to mobile staff service 
agencies (called as labor relation consigners) and the 
ones employed by labor contractors, labor subcontractors 
and other organs supplying implicit job referral (named 
as labor workers), the quantity of temporary employees 
would break one hundred million. Along with its 
development, unequal pay for such temporary workers 
has become increasingly prominent. According to CTG 
China (Employment Services Industry) Employment 
Index Report, the employing cost of temporary workers is 
equivalent to the formal labor cost 60%-70%. The fact of 
temporary workers’ suffering from poor treatment in the 
aspect of labor remuneration even impedes the release of 
Wage Regulations2. 
In China, labor remuneration can be divided into two 
types based on the status of temporary workers. One 
is regarded as wage. Employment-type of dispatching 
workers or labor relation consigners get wages though 
concluding labor contract with labor dispatch agencies or 
with employing units respectively. The other is classified 
as labor remuneration. Labor workers are commonly 
employed and paid so-called labor remuneration in 
accordance with employment contracts3 or with oral 
commitments. Standing on observations on Chinese 
society, most of temporary workers, except registration-
1 See news from http://news.ifeng.com/shendu/fhzk/detail. “Position of sixty million Chinese temporary workers falls to a historic low” 
2011.11.30.
2 See news from http://politics.people.com.cn/gb/99014/15516143.html. “Too much difference from equal pay for equal work to mechanism 
of increasing wage result in difficulties for Wage Regulation to be drafted”, 2011.8.26.
3 In China, employment contract is subject to Civil Law in which there aren’t special articles on wage/labor remuneration and regulations on 
principle of equal pay for equal work.
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type of dispatching workers4, are confronted with 
remuneration discrimination. 
In China, there are two points of views on unequal 
payment for temporary workers. One view is that different 
remuneration problem is difficult to be solved because of 
the attraction to employing units derived from low labor 
cost and the dual-track employment system5 (Su, 2008). 
The other view is that labor workers should have the right 
of equal pay by law. Hence, solutions to the problem must 
be found. The main efforts are as follows: (1) to attempt to 
solve the problem through adjustment of legislation. For 
example, trying to determine standards of “equal work” 
and “equal pay” more explicitly; increasing employers’ 
burden of proof by adopting of “shifting of burden of 
evidence”; designing of far more severe punishment 
procedure aiming at unequal pay for temporary workers 
and etc. (Shen, 2008). (2) to explore new ways from 
employing units’ human resource management. “equal 
pay for equal post”,  “equal pay for equal output” or  “same 
wage distribution mechanism for same post” is proposed. 
(3) to attempt to avoid unequal pay. Suggestions include 
that allocating temporary workers only in the same type 
of posts; attempting to reduce the wage level of staff 
working at monopolistic organizations to a rational scope; 
only using temporary workers in the adjuvant or replaced 
posts and etc..
The previous observations and researches indicate 
the complexity and significance of equal pay problem for 
temporary workers. This paper will probe into this problem 
again from the perspectives of labor transaction game. 
1 .   LABOR PRIC ING AND LABOR 
REMUNERATION COMPARISON
In contrast with the process of reaching wage contract 
with so-called regular workers in micro-organization, 
formation of temporary workers’ remuneration includes 
two steps, one is labor pricing and the other is internal 
human capital pricing by employment service agency 
with the former becoming constraint on the latter. In 
China, most of temporary workers can be regarded as 
homogeneous ones because they mainly provide ordinary 
labor, and this is convenient for us to build model. Since 
labor price formation for temporary workers is either 
through bargaining or through tendering and bidding, the 
following discussion will be made along two approaches. 
1.1  Remuneration Comparison Based on 
Bargaining Mechanism
Assume labor transaction occurs between some 
employing unit and some employment service agency. 
On this condition, the two parties can reach agreement by 
bargaining with finite times.
Firstly, assume that an employing unit intends 
to purchase some labor services, set vP, lP  and ωP as 
employing unit’s private value on the labor services, the 
estimated employment quantity and reference worker’s 
wage respectively, and then we have
p
p
p l
v=ϖ
 
.
Secondly, calculate the labor price based on bargaining 
mechanism. According to Rubinstein-Stahl Alternating 
Offer Model (Zhang, 2001), the nature of the labor 
transaction is that employment service agencies (named 
as P1) and employing unit (named as P2) bid by turns to 
allocate the distributable funds vP. Because of the division 
of vP , the labor price based on bargaining must be lower 
than employing unit’s estimated value on the labor 
services which it intends to buy. 
Every bargaining process can be divided into odd-
numbered time and even-numbered time, namely t time 
and T time respectively (the initial time is recorded as 
1). Presume it is P1 who gives a bid firstly and proposes 
to distribute according to the rule of (xt ,vP－xt) (where t 
= 1,3,5,…, 2k-1; k is a natural number; xt is employment 
service agency’s sharing utility mainly subsuming 
income from sending temporary workers and charging 
intermediary fees). If P2 accepts P1’s proposal, the 
game is over. On the contrary, if P2 rejects and the two 
parties are willing to have talks continuously, then the 
game enter T time (where T = 2,4,6,…, 2k; k is a natural 
number) in which role reversal takes place between the 
two parties and it is turn for P2 to give a counter-offer. 
Set δ1, δ2 (0 ≤ δi ≤ 1, i = 1, 2) as the discount factor of P1 
and P2 respectively6. If the bargaining ends at t time, P1’s 
discount utility is δ1
t-1xt, and that of P2’s is δ2
t-1(vp-xt). If 
the last bid is rejected, the bidding talks pass over and 
4 In China, registration-type of dispatching workers (such as hourly-paid workers, housekeepers, professional and technical personnel and so 
on) are usually employed by families or by mini-enterprises. In recent years, the supply of these sorts of person is so less than market demand 
that they can usually bargaining with employers directly and get satisfied rewards. What’s more, they usually work at workplace separately, 
so there isn’t problem of unequal pay for them due to no reference workers. Therefore, the following studies will not involve in these sorts of 
person.
5 Dual-track employment system is refer that one part of employees in an employing unit are regular staff with post staffing allocated through 
methods of appointment, selection, or insiders’ recommendation, while the other part is contrarily irregular staff without post staffing and is 
treated unequally or even badly.
6 δ means the counter-biding ability of two parties. There are two extreme value for δ, that is 0 and 1. δ=0 demonstrates that the player is 
without patience (for instance, either employee or employer is busy doing something in a hurried manner), has no counter-biding ability in 
the bargaining (for instance, the other party in talks is the sole and indispensable choice although one party bid exorbitantly), or bears ex-
tremely high time-delay cost (for example, labor initiate work stoppage resulting in heavy losses to make pressure on manager during the 
course of talks). δ=1 indicates contrarily that the player is most patient, with outstanding bargaining ability, or the time-delay cost is zero.
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both of the parties’ sharing utilities are zero. With previous 
assumptions, there are four patterns of bargaining talks, 
that is Pattern i: first-mover P1 and terminator P17; Pattern 
ii: first-mover P1 and terminator P2; Pattern iii: first-
mover P2 and terminator P1; Pattern iv: first-mover P2 
and terminator P2. To adopt reversal regression method, 
we can get employment service agency’s four income 
(named as x1,1, x1,2, x2,1, x2,2 respectively) in four bargaining 
patterns (Ge & Wang, 2009). 
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Let t = T +1; T = 2k, inserting t and T in Equation (1), 
we get
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In the same way, we get
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From Equation (1) to (4), it can be seen that the price 
of labor transaction is influenced by the discount factor of 
two parties and the bidding order (Zuo, 2010 & 2011). For 
ease of remuneration comparison between the temporary 
workers and the reference employees, suppose that the 
employment service agency will deduct intermediary fee 
ε (0＜ε＜rx), r is a reasonable or general profit margin; 
x is the agency’s income from labor transaction8. Then 
based on the homogeneity assumption, presume that 
employment service agency will send la workers (with 
average wage va) to response for the labor agreement. 
According to forgoing equations, when agency is the 
first-mover, then
a
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; when employing 
unit is the first-mover, then
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. 
Obviously, va1 >va2, which means the temporary workers 
would get higher wage when employment service agency 
bids firstly than they did when employing unit bid firstly. 
After comparing, we can get 
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(Since e is usually much less than vp, such simplify 
can be made). It is thus clear that some factors should be 
adjusted as follows to reach equal pay between temporary 
workers and reference ones. These factors include the 
two parties’ respective discount factor, the quantity of 
workers intended to be leased by the employing unit and 
the quantity of temporary workers intended to be sent by 
agency. Owing to the negligible productivity difference 
between the regular staff and the temporary workers, 
the value of 
αl
lp
 can be considered as 1. In that case, 
the value for δ1 and δ2 will determinates remuneration 
comparison results between temporary workers and 
reference employees. Obviously, one way to reach equal 
pay is to raise δ1 or drop δ2. Here, an extreme case is 
the labor transaction price and the temporary workers’ 
remuneration would be decided only by counter-bidding 
ability of employment service agency (δ1).  
Concerning employment service agencies, employment 
service agency, positive factors affecting agency’s counter-
bidding ability include agency’s influence in the labor 
transaction market, specialization of agency, conversion 
cost for employing unit to replacement other agencies9, 
agency’s market information and the incentive measures 
inducing agency’s bargainer to endeavor to get better 
bargaining price and etc.. To promote these positive factor 
play a greater role, considerations should be given to the 
following approach. Measures include: (1) centralization 
and specialization of agencies; (2) to increase temporary 
workers’ human capital value; (3) to improve internal 
performance management and motivation mechanism 
inside agencies. In present, the work of centralization 
and specialization should be carried out especially in 
7 First-mover is refer to the one who bids firstly. Terminator is refer to the one who can determine to end the bargaining.
8 Intermediary fee can be charged in two ways. One way is to collect x yuan from every sent labor workers; the other way is to deduct x% 
from labor remuneration of every sent labor workers.
9 Conversion cost includes one-time cost for change of agencies, training cost of new labor workers, time cost and etc..
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the industries or fields with massive use of temporary 
workers, such as banking industry, coal industry, 
construction industry, central-governed enterprise, public 
sectors and so on.  
With reference to employing units, the suggestion to 
restrain their bargaining ability is to bring pressure to 
them to disclose relative information on using temporary 
workers.
1.2  Remuneration Comparison Based on 
Tendering and Bidding Mechanism
The larger size of the transaction can be concluded via 
tendering and bidding approach. In labor tendering and 
bidding, employing unit (the seller of labor agreement) 
is always attempting to maximize its seller’s surplus by 
mechanism design (e.g., selection of optimal tendering 
type; determination of bidding rules and etc.) usually, 
employing unit can elevate its average yield by setting 
designed base price. Employment service agency (the 
buyer of labor agreement) contrarily pays more attention 
to take appropriate strategies so as to win the bid and to 
attain maximum buyer’s surplus simultaneously.
Assume the quantity of employment service agencies 
participating bidding is n. Set v as the parties’ private 
value on labor agreement, among which, v0 or v
* is 
employing unit’s private value or the designed base price 
respectively; vi (a random variable in the interval [a, z]
with distribution function of Fi(vi) and density function 
of fi(vi) is the private value of i (i is some employment 
service agency). Let Pi(v) represents ith probability of 
winning a bid and Ti(v) shows its payoff expectation. Then 
employing unit’s expectation utility is ( )∑
=
Λ
n
i
ni vvvTE
1
21 ,,,
if it is risk-neutral. Finally, the optimal mechanism design 
can be abstracted as a linear programming problem:
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As is shown in Myerson’s proof, on condition of 
conforming to the hypothesis in Revenue Equivalence 
Theorem,  i f  
( )( )*
*
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--= ,  employing  un i t ’s 
tendering earnings would be maximum. Obviously, v0 > 
v*, which means employing unit’s private value on labor 
service contract is larger than the designed base price 
strictly. Only the bidding in accordance with inequality of 
vi <v
*<v0 can employment service agency win the bid. 
Similarly, let 
0
0
0 l
v=v (v0 is reference worker’s wage; 
l0 is the quantity of reference workers in employing unit). 
Presume the bidding price of winning unit is v'i. When 
adopting first-price sealed bid, then the optimal bidding of 
agency v'il is equal to
( )
( )in
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dxxF
v
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−
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(Qin, 2005); When 
it is second-price sealed bid, then the equilibrium bidding 
v'i2 is equal to vi. Assume that agency sends some workers 
to take charge of the labor agreement. The quantity of 
workers is la and their average remuneration is va as well. 
Then we can get 
α
ev
l
v'i
a
-= ( e is intermediary fee). 
After comparing, we’ll have 
0
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0
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v
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(based 
on the same simplify as previous subsection). Labor 
remunerations of temporary workers is strictly less than 
wages of reference employees working at employing unit 
in tendering and bidding mechanism because v'i is strictly 
less than v0. When bid quotation is closest to employing 
unit’s designed base price, the minimum pay gap can be 
gotten. 
After analysis, it is clear that there is inevitable 
remuneration discrimination for temporary workers 
when tendering and bidding process is adopted in the 
labor transaction. As for narrowing the pay gap, the only 
certainty is that temporary workers working at got bid unit 
could earn more if condition that quantity of bidders were 
limited in a narrow range could be met.    
CONCLUSION
The paper emphatically studies the feasible methods 
for temporary workers to be paid equally by means of 
concept of labor price. The mathematical analysis on 
bargaining mechanism demonstrates that centralization 
and specification of employment service agencies is 
good for alleviation of temporary workers remuneration 
discrimination. The analysis on tendering and bidding 
mechanism indicates that unequal pay is an intrinsic 
derivative of the process and can not be avoided 
consequently. It seems that the problem of temporary 
workers’ unequal pay can not be solved solely depending 
on market mechanism, so the social administrators 
should give more help to temporary workers by legal, 
administrative, economic and other means to maintain 
their equal pay right. 
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